Values in the EU's Neighbourhood Policy: Political Rhetoric or Reflection of a Coherent Policy? European Political Economy Review No. 7 (Summer 2007), pp. 38-62 by Bosse, Giselle.
 
European Political Economy Review  ISSN 1742-5697 
No. 7 (Summer 2007),  pp. 38-62  www.eper.org 
  
 
 
 
Values  in  the  EU’s  Neighbourhood 
Policy: Political Rhetoric or Reflection 
of a Coherent Policy?
* * * * 
 
 
Giselle Bosse* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  (ENP)  is  often  justified  by 
references to its unprecedented emphasis on the “commitment to 
shared values” in future EU relations with its vicinity. Few attempts 
have been made, however, to critically reflect on the “values di-
mension” of the ENP. This article examines if the ENP can be suffi-
ciently justified on the basis of the political values it embodies: It 
explores the extent to which the declared commitment to values in 
the ENP is based on a wider consensus at the EU-level; the chang-
ing emphasis on “shared values” in the policy over time; and the 
degree to which the ENP adds to institutionalising political values 
in future EU relations with its neighbours.  
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1.   Introduction 
 
“We are also committed to developing ever deeper ties and bridges of co-
operation with our neighbours and to share the future of this community of 
values with others beyond our shores” (European Council 2003) 
 
In 2002 the EU began to develop a policy towards its neighbouring 
countries in order to avoid new lines of division on the European 
continent following the 2004 Eastward enlargement and in order to 
meet the challenges arising from the newly created borders. Initial 
proposals for the European Neighbourhood Policy stress the impor-
tance of ‘shared European values’ as the basis for future enhanced 
relations with all neighbouring partner states. 
 
Much of the existing literature examines the role of shared Euro-
pean values inside the EU (Christiansen et al. 2001, Merlingen et al. 
2001, Leconte 2005) or in the context of the emergence of an insti-
tutionalised  system  of  EU  Foreign  Policy,  including  a  common 
European foreign policy identity based on shared norms and values 
(Smith M. E. 2004). The development and significance of political 
values in the ENP has not been addressed. This lack of scholarly at-
tention surprises, not only because of the major importance attrib-
uted  to  ‘shared  values’  by  policy-makers  on  the  ENP,  who  fre-
quently refer to the value dimension of the ENP as a major im-
provement  on  existing  EU  policy  (Ferrero-Waldner  2006).  Very 
few studies have placed the ENP in the context of existing EU pol-
icy and examined the extent to which the ENP does in fact signifi-
cantly increase the importance of political values in relations with 
neighbouring states. The following article therefore aims to analyse 
the values dimension of the ENP in more detail: Does it reflect po-
litical rhetoric only or is it an expression of a clear and improved 
‘values-based’ policy towards neighbouring states?  
 
As there is no standard definition of ‘shared European values’, the 
enquiry here looks at those values commonly associated with the 
Copenhagen political criteria developed by the EU in the context of 
the 2004 Eastward enlargement. They include: stable political insti-
tutions, guarantees for democracy, the rule of law, respect for hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms and minority rights (Euro-
pean Council 1993). An EU interpretation of its own values was 40  European Political Economy Review  
   
chosen because it is highly likely that EU policy-makers draw on a 
similar understanding of values also in the ENP. At the same time, 
the emphasis here is placed on political values rather than economic 
values related to ‘market economy’, which have been discussed suf-
ficiently elsewhere (Milcher et al. 2006, Denysyuk 2005).  
 
In order to judge the extent to which the ENP ‘improves’ existing 
policies towards neighbouring states, the article will draw on ap-
proaches developed to better understand the Unions political iden-
tity based on values (Weiler 1997, Lucarelli 2006, Beetham, Lord 
1998: 33-58). These approaches place an emphasis on the political 
and civic values upon which the EU is based, and have developed 
criteria through which to judge the ability of the Union to justify its 
policies on the basis of these values. These criteria are highly rele-
vant for analysing the ENP, which is above all a policy based on 
(and justified by) ‘shared values’. The criteria include (i) the coher-
ence and consistency of the policy discourse on the significance and 
substance of ‘shared values’, (ii) a wider consensus on the content 
of values, rather than select member state interests or technocratic 
EU  institutional  interests  and  (iii)  the  existence  of  appropriate 
measures to institutionalise the relevance and enforceability of val-
ues.
  
 
In the first part, the article analyses the significance of shared politi-
cal values in existing EU external relations with now ENP partner 
states. The second part then takes a closer look at the formulation 
process of the ENP in order to identify if, over time, the discourse 
on and role of political values in the ENP has been consistent, and if 
the substance of ‘shared values’ in the policy reflects a broader con-
sensus on the EU level or not. The third part focuses on ENP in-
struments and the extent to which they allow for the practical im-
plementation and institutionalisation of ‘shared values’ through the 
policy.  
 
 
2.   Political  values  in  EU  relations  with  neighbouring  states 
prior to the ENP 
 
In order to analyse if and how the ENP improves the value dimen-
sion of EU relations with its neighbourhood, it is important to ex-Bosse: Values in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy  41 
amine  the  role  of  political  values  in  existing  EU  policies.  These 
policies followed a predominantly regional approach: relations with 
the  Western  Newly  Independent  States  (NIS),  the  Mediterranean 
(EuroMed Partnership) and the South Caucasus. 
 
2.1  EU relations with the Western NIS 
 
Following  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  the  EU’s  relations  with 
neighbouring states in the East went through several stages, from 
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) concluded with 
Moldova,  Ukraine  and  Belarus  between  1994  and  1995  and  the 
2003 European Neighbourhood Policy.
1  
 
The PCAs mainly focus on trade matters and contain few references 
to  European  values  (Missiroli  2004).  Values  are  not  usually  in-
cluded as part of agreement provisions but rather highlighted in the 
preambles or introductory  articles. Most provisions of the PCAs, 
however, do not explicitly refer to ‘shared values’ and instead focus 
on trade relations.  
 
During the early post-cold war period, few distinctions were made 
between the quality of democracy, the rule of law and human rights 
between the Western NIS. If there were disagreements among the 
member  states  on  EU  policy  towards  these  countries,  they  were 
predominantly based on geography and differences regarding the al-
location of EU resources to the ‘north’, ‘south’ or ‘east’ (Emerson 
et al. 2005).  
 
However,  Vladimir  Putin’s  domestic  policy  making  increasingly 
worried some of the member states, and the 2004 Orange Revolu-
tion  in  Ukraine  led  to  calls  for  prioritising  the  country  over  and 
above Russia in EU policy towards the East and to renew the em-
phasis on shared values. In autumn 2004 the Nordic member states, 
Austria and seven new member states from CEE called for a greater 
                                                 
1  For  the  PCAs  with  Ukraine  and  Moldova,  see  Commission  Website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/pca/index.htm. The PCA with 
Belarus was negotiated in 1995 but never came into force because of the deterio-
rating political situation and President Lukashenko’s moves towards authoritarian 
rule. 42  European Political Economy Review  
   
engagement with Ukraine and less support for enhanced coopera-
tion with Russia (Emerson et al. 2005: 17).  
 
Several of the old member states, however, remained highly critical 
of this new approach and did not shy away from open disagreement 
with their counterparts in the Union. Italian ex-prime minister Silvio 
Berlusconi, for example, misused his position as president of the 
European Council in 2003 to declare his willingness to volunteer as 
Putin’s advocate over Chechnia and support to Putin over the Yukos 
affair. For France, Russia is a key building block in the creation of a 
global multi-polar order and it is crucial as a supplier of oil and 
natural  gas.  Germany  under  Chancellor  Schroeder  shared  with 
France the priority placed on Russia in terms of geo-economic in-
terests (Emerson et al. 2005: 18-19). 
 
At the same time, the UK (together with Sweden) was at the fore-
front  in  supporting  the  development  of  enhanced  relations  with 
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus and the inclusion of the commitment 
to shared values as the basis of theses relations. This approach was 
supported by the Commission and, to an even greater extent by the 
European Parliament which has been very consistent in its calls for 
a greater role of democracy and the rule of law in EU external rela-
tions (European Parliament 2006).  
 
In other words and to summarise, political values have not always 
ranked  high  on  the  political  agenda  of  EU  relations  with  its 
neighbours in the East. The question thus arises, of whether or not 
the ENP can improve the standing of and agreement on the role of 
‘shared values’ in relations with its ‘new’ neighbours in the East, or 
if indeed the ENP falls within or deepens current divisions among 
the member states and EU institutions.  
 
2.2  EU relations with the South Caucasus 
 
PCAs with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were all concluded in 
1999  and  references  to  values  and  democratic  principles  are  the 
same in all three agreements. The preambles emphasise the links 
between the Community, its member states and the respective part-Bosse: Values in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy  43 
ner state and “the common values they share”.
2 They all foresee co-
operation on the observance of principles of democracy and the re-
spect for and promotion of human rights as part of political dialogue. 
Most surprisingly, however, all agreements contain a title VIII on 
“Cooperation on matters relating to democracy and human rights”, 
including the establishment of democratic institutions, the strength-
ening of the rule of law and the protection of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms (PCA Georgia, PCA Azerbaijan, PCA Armenia).  
 
The inclusion of the human rights clauses into the PCAs with the 
South Caucasus does, however, not reflect an agreement on the EU 
level on the content and importance of shared values in relations 
with the respective states. Title VIII can be traced back to pressure 
from the EP which threatened to block or at least hold up the con-
clusion of the PCAs. Rather than ‘agreeing’ with the EP, the Coun-
cil at the time decided to strategically appease the institution by in-
cluding Title VIII (European Parliament 2005). 
 
In  general,  the  South  Caucasus  has  not  received  much  attention 
from the member states amongst whom only Sweden has pushed for 
a more coherent EU strategy towards the region. The European Par-
liament on the other hand has gone through great efforts to lobby 
for the inclusion of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan into the ENP, 
mainly on the grounds of supporting political and economic reforms 
in the countries and for greater EU involvement in conflict resolu-
tion and post-conflict reconstruction (Crisis Group Europe 2006). 
The ENP is usually seen as a major stepping stone in EU engage-
ment with the region: But is this new enhanced relationship based 
on commitments to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms? 
 
2.3  EU relations with the Mediterranean 
 
The Union concluded several Association Agreements (AA) with 
partner states in the Mediterranean within the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership between 1997 and 2004. References to shared values in 
the Association Agreements with Tunisia (1998), Israel (2000), Mo-
                                                 
2 For the PCAs with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, see Commission Website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/pca/index.htm   44  European Political Economy Review  
   
rocco (2000), Jordan (2002), Egypt (2004), Lebanon (2002) and the 
Palestinian Authority (1997 on an interim basis) are few and all fol-
low the same template.
3 The preambles state the consideration by 
all  parties  of  the  ‘proximity  and  interdependence  which  historic 
links  and  values  have  established’  between  the  Community,  its 
Member states and the Mediterranean partner state in question.
4 Ar-
ticle 2 in almost all AAs refers to the respect for democratic princi-
ples and fundamental human rights which “shall inspire the domes-
tic and international policies of the parties”. The emphasis of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements is on trade, regional 
cooperation and cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Af-
fairs, rather than political values.  
 
The 1995 Barcelona Declaration itself enshrines the formal com-
mitment to the promotion of human rights and democratic values. 
However, the discourse on “shared values” in the Barcelona Decla-
ration and the Association Agreements does not reflect a broad con-
sensus at the EU level on the importance and content of “shared 
values”. Southern member states in particular made clear their em-
phasis on “stability” in the region, and reluctance to push for greater 
political reforms. References to “shared norms” in the context of the 
Barcelona Process emerged out of complex bargaining at the EU 
level and a tactical trade-off between the Southern and Northern 
member states. Still, as part as a response to the 9/11 attacks, the 
EU begun to develop new guidelines to enhance its support for de-
                                                 
3 Association Agreements with Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon 
and  the  Palestinian  Authority,  see  Commission  Website:  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/doc.htm;  Negotiations  of 
the AA with Syria were finalised in 2004  but the signature of the AA by the 
Council is pending Syria’s co-operation with regard to regional stability in the 
light of Syrian responses to the independent UN Investigation Commission and 
associated UNSC Resolutions, the AA with Algeria is still in the process of ratifi-
cation and negotiations with Libya on the AA have not started because the coun-
try has yet to accept the Barcelona acquis. These ENP partner states are therefore 
not subject to the discussion here. EU relations with Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority and the role of values have been discussed elsewhere and cannot be 
analysed in detail within the limited framework of the article here due to the 
complexity of the relationship. 
4 Association Agreements with Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon; 
see  Commission  Website: 
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mocracy, human rights and the rule of law in the Southern Mediter-
ranean.  This  development  is  generally  seen  as  a  step  towards  a 
shared understanding on human rights and democratic reforms as 
well as the notion of “positive conditionality” (Emerson et al. 2005: 
21).  
 
But significant differences remain over the critical tone in official 
EU values discourse to human rights abuses in the respective part-
ner states, gradual versus conditional political reform and divergent 
funding  priorities  among  southern  and  northern  member  states. 
Apart  from  the  differences  between  southern  and  northern  EU 
member states, EU institutions have not addressed the commitment 
to shared values in a coherent manner, in terms of official discourse 
as well as policy implementation. DG Trade has been reluctant to 
embrace conditionality in EU policies towards the Maghreb. Geo-
graphical desk officers try not to jeopardise sensitive diplomatic re-
lations through democracy and human rights initiatives. Commis-
sion officials dealing with the Middle East peace process in particu-
lar feared that the emphasis on human rights in the EMP under-
mined the primacy of peace process initiatives and negotiations.
5  
 
The disagreement between member states  and  within EU institu-
tions on the nature and purpose of ‘shared values’ has also prohib-
ited the enforcement of provisions on democracy and human rights 
contained in the Association Agreements. Article 2, which provides 
the legal base for appropriate measures in the event of a serious 
breach  of  international  human  rights  standards,  has  hardly  been 
used to date (Emerson, Noutcheva 2005: 6). The implementation of 
the  Mediterranean  AAs  is  supported  by  the  MEDA  financial  in-
strument. Similar to provisions in the TACIS instrument, however, 
MEDA does contain few references to shared democratic values, 
human rights or fundamental freedoms. In addition no mechanisms 
exist in MEDA to effectively monitor the human rights performance 
in Mediterranean partner states (Emerson, Noutcheva 2005: 6). 
 
The  discourse  on  ‘shared  values’  in  existing  EU  policy  towards 
neighbouring states in the Mediterranean does therefore not reflect a 
broad agreement on the EU level. The few references to democratic 
                                                 
5 Interview, Commission Official, 1 August 2006, Brussels. 46  European Political Economy Review  
   
principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms that do exist are 
mainly the outcome of strategic intergovernmental bargaining, re-
main insufficiently institutionalised in the respective financial in-
struments and are rarely enforced in practice. 
 
2.4  Sanctions towards ENP partner states 
 
Another means for the Union to institutionalise “shared values” in 
its relations with neighbouring states is the use of sanctions. In prac-
tice, these can range from embargoes on EU products, a ban on the 
import of products from the targeted country, the restriction of dip-
lomatic contacts and restrictions on the admission of individuals in 
EU territory (Council of the EU 2003, 2004). The EU has applied 
sanctions on a number of third states that are now part of the ENP. 
Libya and Syria had to face arms embargos as part of a Union-wide 
effort  to  fight  terrorism.  Azerbaijan  and  Armenia  continue  to  be 
subject  to  arms  embargoes  imposed  by  the  Union  and  following 
OSCE efforts to resolve the Nagorno Karabach conflict. Belarus has 
been targeted by the EU for its treatment of EU staff and interna-
tional observers and has seen various restrictions on the movement 
of government officials  over the  years. Restrictions of admission 
continue to be imposed on Moldova, in support of the peace process 
in Transdniestria (Kreutz 2005). Still, the EU has invoked no sanc-
tions explicitly to protect democracy and human rights in its imme-
diate neighbourhood. On the one hand, this is surprising, not least 
because around 56% of EU sanctions worldwide are linked to de-
mocracy and human rights (Kreutz 2005: 20). Yet on the other hand, 
it is a clear indication of the lack of agreement or operational coher-
ence  at  the  EU  level  in  respect  to  invoking  sanctions  vis-à-vis 
neighbouring states. 
 
One of the reasons behind the focus on terrorism and intrastate con-
flict of EU sanctions towards its immediate neighbourhood is linked 
to direct security-based considerations and fears of consequences on 
EU territory  (Kreutz 2005: 20). EU sanctions policy towards the 
rest of the world is more ‘values-based’, as it is geared towards the 
protection of democracy and human rights. In other words, the Un-
ion has so far not institutionalised the promotion of “shared values” 
in  its  neighbourhood:  The  lack  of  democracy  or  human  rights Bosse: Values in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy  47 
abuses have not led EU decision makers to impose sanctions on 
ENP partner states.  
 
The role and significance of political values in existing relations be-
tween the Union and its neighbours has by no means been coherent. 
Community financial instruments have not sufficiently institutional-
ised the commitment to democratic reforms and sanction mecha-
nisms have rarely been used to reinforce human rights or fundamen-
tal freedoms in neighbouring states. In other words, “shared values” 
are not elaborated in a coherent discourse at the EU level, member 
state interests have largely precluded the development of a general 
consensus on the content and importance of “shared values” in EU 
relations with its neighbours and the commitment to those values 
has not been enforced. The following chapter therefore examines to 
what extent and in what ways the European Neighbourhood Policy 
changes the discourse and practical implementation of political val-
ues in EU relations with its neighbourhood. 
 
 
3.   Values vs. interests: Changing emphases on values in the 
ENP  
 
Early drafts of the ENP map out a very ambitious agenda in respect 
to the values upon which the enhanced relations with its neighbours 
should be based. In its Communication on the ENP Strategy Paper, 
the Commission enumerates the following aspects of European val-
ues,  this  time  under  the  explicit  heading  of  the  ‘Commitment  to 
Shared Values’:  
 
·  strengthening of democracy and rule of law, reform of the judi-
ciary and fight against corruption and organized crime 
·  respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including 
freedom of media and expression, rights of minorities and chil-
dren, gender equality, trade union rights and other core labour 
standards, fight against the practice of torture and prevention of 
ill-treatment 
·  support for the development of civil society 
·  cooperation with the ICC 48  European Political Economy Review  
   
·  commitments required to essential aspects of EU external action, 
such as fight against terrorism and proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, as well as abidance by international law and 
efforts to achieve conflict resolution (Commission 2004a). 
 
3.1  ENP Country Reports 
 
The ENP Strategy Paper was accompanied by the first set of Coun-
try Reports (Commission 2004a). The Country Reports outline and 
summarise the current state of relations between the Union and the 
respective ENP partner state. All reports take the form of internal 
unilateral Commission working documents. DG External Relations 
was in charge of drafting the general sections of the Country Re-
ports, which were then forwarded to the respective Country desks 
which would further elaborate and add specific details under each 
heading.
6 The major emphasis in the Country Reports is on the state 
of legislative reform and liberalisation in ENP partner states, pre-
dominantly  in  the  economic  sector  and  criminal  justice  system. 
However, the Country Reports do also contain two fairly extensive 
sections on democracy and the rule of law as well as human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.  
 
In its ENP Country Report on Moldova, for example, the European 
Commission broadly examines the current state of these commit-
ments in application to the Republic. Interestingly, the report starts 
with  a  reinterpretation  of  the  significance  of  “values”  within  the 
former PCA, and then underlines the importance of development of 
political institutions based on these values – democracy, the rule of 
law and human rights (Commission 2004b).  
 
The Commission Report also highlights various deficiencies in the 
commitment to shared values by Moldova. “Democracy and the rule 
of law” require improvements, specifically with a view on democ-
ratic elections, laws on political parties and socio-political organiza-
tions, powers of local government, an independent judicial system 
and  criminal  procedure  codes  to  fight  corruption  (Commission 
2004b: 6-8). The human rights situation in Transdniestria is high-
                                                 
6 Interview, Commission Official, 21 June 2006, Brussels. Bosse: Values in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy  49 
lighted  and  heavily  criticized  by  the  Commission  (Commission 
2004b: 10-11). 
 
The Country Reports are almost all critical of the democratic con-
duct of elections, inefficient or partial judicial systems, corruption, 
limits to the freedom of the media, the freedoms of expression and 
association, the protection of women’s rights, children’s rights and 
minority rights, alongside shortcomings in detention conditions, ill-
treatment and torture.
7 The evaluation of the state of democracy and 
human  rights  in  the  two  Eastern  neighbour  states,  Moldova  and 
Ukraine,  as well as the South Caucasus, appear fairly direct and 
concrete,  whereas  the  Country  Reports  for  Jordan  and  Morocco 
seem more diplomatic in the choice of language used to express 
shortcomings of the respective governments. The Country Report 
on  Jordan  emphasises  that  the  Jordanian  government  has  ‘recog-
nised the need’ for further measures to guarantee the independence 
and efficiency of the judiciary; rather than pointing to the partiality 
of the judicial system directly. Egypt and Tunisia, on the other hand, 
are harshly criticised for their lack of respect of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.
 8  
 
The ENP therefore establishes an extensive framework on the na-
ture and the content of “shared values” largely defined as political 
values, such as fundamental rights and freedoms as well as democ-
racy and the rule of law. This particular interpretation of values, 
however, does primarily reflect an agreement within the European 
Commission and the Wider Europe Task Force, rather than the EU 
level as a whole.
9 
 
On concluding the PCAs, the EU had only just begun to discuss the 
meaning of Europe and its common values. With the EU’s decision 
to offer membership to some Central and East European countries 
(CEECs) in 1993, the European Commission and its DG Enlarge-
ment in particular, developed a set of membership criteria which 
would  condition  eventual  accession.  The  Copenhagen  criteria 
                                                 
7  ENP  Country  Reports,  see  Commission  Website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#5   
8 Ibid. 
9 Interview, Commission Official, 21 June 2006, Brussels. 50  European Political Economy Review  
   
clearly defined political criteria or “values” such as stable institu-
tions, guarantee for democracy, the rule of law, respect for human 
rights  and  minority  rights  as  prerequisites  for  EU  membership 
(European Council 1993).  
 
Commission personnel was directly transferred from DG Enlarge-
ment to the newly established Wider Europe Task Force, as were 
the policy frameworks of transition and the methodology from the 
process of enlargement.
10 
 
The emphasis on “shared values” in the Country Reports is there-
fore not necessarily a sign or outcome of an inclusive and values-
based policy-making process, but rather a Commission-centric and 
heavily path-dependent mode of policy formulation (see also: Kel-
ley 2006). 
 
3.2  ENP Action Plans 
 
This impression is reinforced by the closer analysis of the signifi-
cance and content of values in the ENP Action Plans (AP) which 
followed the Strategy Paper and Country Reports. All Action Plans 
concluded to date do commence by stating that the ENP is based on 
a commitment to shared values by all parties and make further pro-
gress in the relationship dependent on the partner state’s achieve-
ments in meeting these commitments.
11 But most Action Plans miss 
the rigour and detail in which values gaps were identified in the ini-
tial Country Reports. 
 
The APs with Ukraine and Moldova do contain a relatively lengthy 
section on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms but the actions to be taken under that heading remain 
vague or subordinate in respect to other headings. The Action Plan 
on Moldova, for example, shifts the emphasis from the ‘commit-
ment to shared values’ and values gaps to cooperation on Justice 
                                                 
10 Interview, Commission Official, 21 June 2006, Brussels. 
11 ENP Action Plans have been agreed with Moldova, Ukraine, Morocco, Jordan 
and Tunisia. APs also exist for Israel and the Palestinian Authority although but 
will not be discussed here. All Action Plans are available online, Commission 
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and Home Affairs, such as border management or the combat of ter-
rorism (ENP AP Moldova 2004). With regards to the Transdniestria 
conflict, the human rights situation is not mentioned except for a 
brief elaboration on ‘efforts towards a settlement (…) guaranteeing 
respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights.’ (Action 
Plan Moldova 2004) The provisions in the ENP Action Plan with 
Ukraine probably offer the most detailed list of actions to be taken 
under the “democracy”  heading (ENP AP Ukraine 2004). At the 
same time, they now appear highly insufficient following the 2004 
Orange revolution and subsequent change in regime – developments 
that occurred after the negotiations of the Action Plan with Ukraine. 
 
The sections on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental free-
doms are kept even shorter and vague in the Action Plans with part-
ner states in the Mediterranean. The AP with Jordan, for example, 
offers no precise definition of the steps to be taken towards political 
reform, specifically in respect to the freedom of expression, the in-
dependence of the media, development of civil society and imple-
mentation  of  international  law  (ENP  AP  Jordan).  Neither  ill-
treatment and torture, nor the treatment of NGOs, are mentioned in 
the AP, despite the pronounced criticism earlier in the Country Re-
ports on the treatment of political detainees and limits to political 
activities by NGOs. The AP with Morocco appears slightly longer, 
but again, it fails to address some of the key criticisms raised in the 
Country report, such as the freedom of the press, women’s rights 
and the protection of minorities (ENP AP Morocco). The Country 
Report on Tunisia was probably the least diplomatic and most criti-
cal of all ENP Country Reports to date, yet the sections on human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the Action Plan are shorter than 
in any other. Respect for the freedom of association, expression and 
media  pluralism  are  all  grouped  together  and  to  be  addressed 
through “liberalising the information industry” or “exchanges and 
cooperation between Tunisian and EU voluntary sectors” (ENP AP 
Tunisia, Art. 4). Neither the strict press code, nor the control over 
private means of communication, nor the practice of torture is men-
tioned in the Action Plan.  
 
In other words, the importance of ‘shared values’ in the ENP varies 
not  only  from  neighbouring  state  to  neighbouring  state  but  also 
from initial Commission proposals and Country Reports to the final 52  European Political Economy Review  
   
ENP Action Plans. Thus the discourse on values, their contents and 
significance is not coherent. And neither does it reflect an EU-level 
wide agreement on ‘shared values’.  
 
Due  to  the  intergovernmental  character  of  the  negotiations,  the 
Southern member states quickly reemphasised their traditional secu-
rity interests in the region: Regime stability, migration control as 
well  as  the  fight  against  terrorism.
12 This  led  to the  inclusion  of 
measures in the Action Plans which potentially harm “shared val-
ues”, and basic human rights in particular. The provisions in the Ac-
tion Plans on combating terrorism, for example, make meagre refer-
ence to ensuring the respect for human rights, and the sections on il-
legal migration or the fight against organised crime make no refer-
ence to human rights at all.
13 
 
The Mediterranean ENP partner states themselves never appeared to 
view the policy as aiming at political reform but rather a means to 
receive  more  financial  assistance  from  the  Union.
14 Almost  all 
Mediterranean ENP partners do not have the ambition to join the 
EU and therefore the opportunities for the Union to enforce political 
reforms were limited from the start. According to one Commission 
official involved in the drafting of the ENP Action Plans with Medi-
terranean partners, the negotiations of the APs in fact constituted 
“proper”  negotiations,  rather  than  mere  consultations  that  the 
Commission had conducted with Accession candidates.
15 In other 
words, also the Commission recognised its limits of enforcing po-
litical values.  
 
In addition, the intergovernmental nature of the negotiations of the 
Action Plans also implies the absence of input into the APs on part 
of  wider  civil  society  and  NGOs.  The  exclusion  of  non-
governmental actors from the negotiations was criticised heavily in-
side and outside the Union. Many governments in Mediterranean 
ENP partner states are accused of lacking commitment to democ-
                                                 
12 Interview, Commission Official, 5 July 2006, Brussels. 
13 With  exception  of  EU-Jordan  AP,  Article  47  on  development  of  adequate 
prison conditions, including enhancement of detention facilities, having regard to 
the protection of fundamental human rights. 
14 Interview, Mission to the EU of Morocco, 19 June 2006, Brussels. 
15 Interview, Commission Official, 21 June 2006, Brussels.  Bosse: Values in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy  53 
ratic values, precisely because they restrict the activities of civil so-
ciety, NGOs and the freedom of expression in general. The inter-
governmentalism  of  the  negotiations  of  the  APs  therefore  poten-
tially reinforces the lack of democratic values in the Mediterranean 
by providing yet another space for the respective governments to 
exclude  non-governmental  actors  from  decision-making  or  their 
general scrutiny function.  
 
The situation was slightly different in respect to the negotiation of 
Action  Plans  of  Ukraine  and  Moldova.  Although  the  documents 
also lack clear and extensive measures to implement the commit-
ments to ‘shared’ democratic values, the Commission was able to 
include a greater number of references to values and human rights 
in particular. The Eastern Europe country desk inside DG External 
Relations had lobbied the coordination unit of the DG to be able to 
insert  references  to  political  values  (human  rights)  into  sections 
other than those linked to democracy and fundamental freedoms.
16  
The AP for Moldova, for example, is one of the few to contain ref-
erences to human rights in the section on Justice and Home Affairs 
and the fight against organised crime. Despite the concerted efforts 
of the Eastern Europe country desk in DG RELEX to reinforce po-
litical  values  in  the  Action  Plans,  the  extent  to  which  the  then 
Ukrainian and Moldovan governments actually committed to these 
values also remains questionable. Very often, the respective politi-
cal elites rhetorically committed to “shared values” in negotiations 
with Commission officials but reversed the commitment in domes-
tic politics (Bogutscaia et al. 2006).  
 
In other words, degree of coherence in the ENP on the significance 
and content of political values towards Ukraine and Moldova, at 
least at the level of official discourse in Country Reports and Ac-
tions Plans. Still, the content of these values does reflect the interest 
of some sections within DG RELEX, rather than a wider agreement 
on the EU level. 
 
Negotiations of the Action Plans with the three states in the South 
Caucasus have just been concluded. The respective APs are more 
focused  in  respect  to  the  ‘new  partnership  perspectives’,  but  the 
                                                 
16 Interview, Commission Official, 6 July 2006, Brussels. 54  European Political Economy Review  
   
emphasis on political values does not significantly differ from the 
other Action Plans.
17 Member states agreed on the inclusion of the 
region into the ENP following the development of the European Se-
curity  Strategy  and  its  emphasis  on  “building  security  in  our 
neighbourhood” (European Security Strategy 2003) The short term 
interests in energy security, crisis management and the fight against 
international crime and corruption therefore dominates EU engage-
ment with the region. Political values such as democracy and the 
rule of law rank secondary in the ENP towards all three states. The 
draft Action Plan with Egypt has also been criticised for its weak-
ness in respect to provisions concerning human rights and funda-
mental  freedoms.  At  the  same  time  as  the  Egyptian  government 
“committed” itself to eradicating the practice of torture as part of 
the ENP Action Plan, for example, it effectively increased the use 
of torture domestically (Daunay, Al-Asmar 2006: 18).  
 
The examination of the role of “shared values” in the development 
of the ENP, its first drafts, Country Reports and Action Plans has 
clearly demonstrated that the EU has not been consistent in its dis-
course on political values. The interests behind the Action Plans in 
particular, appear to give priority to either traditional security inter-
ests of Southern member states or general short term interests of the 
member states in the fight against immigration and terrorism.  
 
Only some sections within the Commission appear to have actively 
lobbied for the inclusion of detailed measures on political values in 
the ENP Action Plans, such as officials from DG enlargement in the 
early  Wider  Europe  Task  Force  or  the  Eastern  Europe  Country 
Desks in DG RELEX. Civil society or other non-governmental in-
terests  were  largely  excluded  from  the  negotiations  of  the  APs. 
Moreover, many ENP partner state governments only committed to 
“shared values” on the level of rhetoric, if such a commitment was 
expressed at all. In other words, there was no agreement on the con-
tent  and  importance  of  “shared  values”  among  actors  at  the  EU 
level, among the member states or among and within ENP partner 
states. 
 
                                                 
17 ENP Action Plans  with  Armenia,  Azerbaijan and Georgia, see  Commission 
website: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#3   Bosse: Values in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy  55 
Finally, intergovernmental negotiations dominated decision-making 
on the Action Plans and traditional member state interests came to 
define the priorities of the ENP: Regime stability in the South and 
the fight against international crime and terrorism instead of long 
term commitments to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.  
 
3.3  ENP Instruments and Implementation 
 
From  2007  the  European  Neighbourhood  and  Partnership  Instru-
ment (ENPI) will replace the existing EU financial assistance to all 
neighbouring states participating in the ENP, including Russia. The 
new instrument will thus succeed TACIS for both Russia and East-
ern  ENP  partner  states  as  well  as  the  MEDA  instrument  for  the 
Mediterranean. According to current proposals by the Commission, 
the objectives of the ENPI will be based on existing agreements, 
Commission Communications and Council Conclusions setting out 
the overall strategy of the Union vis-à-vis neighbouring countries, 
including  the  ENP  action  plans,  where  they  apply  (Commission 
2004c: 3-4). In the case of Russia, priorities will be defined in the 
light of roadmaps on the four common spaces (Commission 2004c: 
4).  
 
Overall, the ENPI aims to support the partner countries’ commit-
ment to common values and principles (Commission 2004c: 12). 
More specifically, the Commission proposes a wide range of objec-
tives covering most aspects of the ENP: The promotion of social 
development and gender equality, employment and social protection, 
core labour standards; the protection of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms and support for democratization; and fostering the 
development of civil society (Commission 2004c: 15). The ENPI 
thus places a fairly equal emphasis on the ‘shared values’ dimension 
of the ENP, in addition to, for example, measures connected to the 
promotion of a market economy or secure border management. Still, 
the exact allocation of funds for the ENPI is still being decided, and 56  European Political Economy Review  
   
it is not certain how much money will be earmarked for the imple-
mentation of democracy and human rights related measures.
18  
 
Apart  from  ENPI  financial  assistance,  could  the  “shared  values” 
dimension of the ENP be better institutionalised through the use of 
sanctions? This is unlikely. First and foremost, the ENP does not 
create  a  new  legal  base  for  relations  between  the  Union  and 
neighbouring partner countries. Therefore the provisions of the As-
sociation or Partnership and Cooperation Agreements continue to 
apply. This means that enhanced relations with partner states cannot 
be suspended on the basis of a breach of the commitment to shared 
values as set out in the ENP Action Plans. Relations can only be 
withdrawn on the basis of a breach of equivalent commitments en-
shrined in existing agreements, which contain (as mentioned earlier) 
even  less  concrete  provisions  on  “shared  values”.  The  member 
states have made clear on numerous occasions in the past that Arti-
cle  2  (on  the  commitment  to  shared  values)  of  the  Association 
Agreements concluded within the framework of the Mediterranean, 
for example, cannot be considered applicable (Daunay, Al-Asmar 
2006: 18).  
 
Moreover, the ENP is designed as a “positive policy”, based on in-
centives,  rather  than  sanctions  of  various  kinds  (Emerson, 
Noutcheva 2005: 15). This approach can almost certainly be con-
sidered as a desirable alternative to the use of military force to im-
pose democratic values, but it still remains unclear if the Union can 
effectively  institutionalise  or  embed  the  values  dimension  of  the 
ENP in practice. Even on a very basic level, the ENP still lacks 
concrete timetables for the implementation of “shared values”, the 
Action Plans do not identify financial and human resources needed 
to implement respective measures and, most importantly, the Union 
lacks  adequate  monitoring  mechanisms  to  follow-up  on  commit-
ments to democratic reforms (Daunay, Al-Asmar 2006: 16). Once 
again,  the  main  reason  behind  the  lack  of  ‘benchmarking’  and 
monitoring in the ENP lies with the Southern member states, who 
refused to take a firm stance on pushing for political reform (as they 
                                                 
18 The Commission had envisaged an amount close to €15,000 million, but the fi-
nal budget allocations for the financial period 2007-2013 commit only €12,000 
million to the ENP.   Bosse: Values in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy  57 
have done in the past and within the framework of the EMP) (Emer-
son et al.: 23). Sanctions in particular require unanimity among the 
foreign ministers of the member states, which demonstrates that the 
institutionalisation of political values through the ENP is not only 
severely limited by deep seated member state interests, but also the 
institutional set-up of the Union. 
 
Political values such as the rule of law, human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms therefore remain fairly loosely institutionalised, even 
under the ENP which originally set out to place “shared values” at 
the heart of EU relations with neighbouring states. The ENPI places 
greater emphasis on the commitment to common values and princi-
ples than either MEDA or TACIS in the past. Yet the question re-
mains of which kind of measures and how many will be supported 
once the ENPI is actually running. Other means of enforcing the po-
litical values dimension of EU relations with its neighbours, such as 
effective benchmarking, monitoring or even sanctions, are neither 
supplemented nor enhanced by the ENP. The ENP does not create 
new  instruments  to  institutionalise  ‘shared  values’  and  without  a 
new legal base, the policy is unlikely to change the enforceability of 
political values. 
 
 
4.   Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the role and importance of shared European values 
in the EU’s policies towards neighbouring states in the East, the 
South  Caucasus  and  the  Mediterranean  has  led  to  the  following 
conclusions. Relations between the Union and its neighbours in the 
past did not prioritise the role of political values such as democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. The few 
provisions that exist in Partnership or Association Agreements are 
vague and remain loosely institutionalized in the respective finan-
cial instruments. Very often, the geopolitical or economic interests 
of member states prevail in EU relations, for example in respect to 
the  Southern  member  states  which  favour  regime  stability  in  the 
Mediterranean, over a clearer emphasis on political reforms. Sanc-
tions have rarely been applied to ENP partner states to enforce the 
commitment to shared values. If a values dimension was included 
into existing policies towards neighbouring states, it was because of 58  European Political Economy Review  
   
strategic bargaining and trade-offs between the  member states or 
between member states and EU institutions, rather than a wider EU- 
level agreement on a set of shared political values. 
 
The article then analysed the extent to which and in what ways the 
ENP changes the role of values in EU relations with its neighbours. 
The first focus was on the relevance and coherence of the values 
discourse in the policy. Early ENP policy drafts and Country Re-
ports suggest a greater emphasis on ‘shared values’ as well as signs 
of the development of a clearer and more consistent definition of 
these values along the lines of the Copenhagen political criteria. But 
could that move be interpreted as a step towards an improved val-
ues-based policy towards neighbouring states? The examination of 
the ENP Action Plans suggests otherwise. Most APs lack the rigour 
and precision with which political values were defined in the Coun-
try Reports.  
 
Secondly, the question was whether or not the (few) provisions in 
the ENP on “shared values” derived from a wider consensus on the 
role and content of values at the EU-level. The answer was again 
fairly disappointing. The negotiations of the ENP Action Plans were 
conducted in an intergovernmental setting and short term interests 
of the member states in stability (fight against corruption, organised 
crime and terrorism) clearly dominated concerns over long term po-
litical  reforms.  Besides,  civil  society  in  neighbouring  states  was 
rarely involved in the negotiations of the APs and ENP partner state 
governments do not seem to endorse or agree on the importance and 
significance of ‘shared values’ either. 
 
The third and final question related to the degree of institutionalisa-
tion of political values in the ENP. Here the new financial instru-
ment, the ENPI, seems to at least suggest a fairly equal emphasis 
placed on support for measures related to democratic reform and 
human rights if compared to measures on cooperation in Justice and 
Home affairs. Clear benchmarks and monitoring mechanisms, how-
ever, do not exist in respect to political reforms and the use of sanc-
tions remains tied to provisions in the Partnership and Cooperation 
or Association Agreements (which were never enforced). 
 Bosse: Values in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy  59 
The lack of a coherent and consistent discourse on political values, 
the lack of a wider EU-level agreement on the contents and signifi-
cance of these values as well as the limited degree of institutionali-
sation of values in the ENP all suggest that the new policy does not 
significantly  improve  existing  EU  policies  towards  neighbouring 
states. The policy appears to continue to apply different sets of val-
ues to different neighbouring states and often member states’ short 
term interests dominate the Union’s agenda vis-à-vis its neighbours. 
Furthermore, the gap between political rhetoric on “shared values” 
and the capability to enforce these values is widened rather than re-
duced through the ENP – at least in its current legal set-up.
19 Finally, 
progress  in  ENP  implementation  to  date  has  been  achieved  pre-
dominantly in respect to short term economic reform and liberalisa-
tion as well as cooperation on visa-facilitation and readmission.
20 
The implementation of the commitment to shared political values 
and long term political reform remains the key challenge for the 
ENP.  
 
“The EU should refrain  from supporting totalitarian regimes (…). This 
used to take place for such regimes to protect the European gates against 
terrorism and immigration with methods that do not serve peoples’ inter-
ests  and  nourish  terrorism”  (Cairo  Institute  for  Human  Rights  Studies 
2006). 
 
 
                                                 
19 The legal base of the AAs or PCAs upon which the ENP currently draws may 
change with the negotiation of ‘enhanced agreements’. These are currently envis-
aged for both Ukraine and Russia. The new agreements will be comprehensive 
agreements covering all areas of EU relations with both states, including provi-
sions on common values. See for example: Commission (2006) or Emerson, Tas-
sinari, Vahl (2006).  
20 On the current state of the implementation of the Action Plan with Ukraine, see 
for  example  Commission  Website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ukraine/intro/index.htm .  60  European Political Economy Review  
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